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Abstract
We present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro-social values in which
parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly
available to their children. Differently from existing models of cultural transmission of
values (such as Bisin and Verdier, 2001, and Tabellini, 2008) we assume that parents are
exclusively concerned with their children’s material welfare. If parents coordinate their
educational choices, a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her
contemporaries, with whom she may interact. A parent may thus choose to instil pro-
social values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted.
This implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that
stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare, even if their children’s material
welfare is all they care about.
Jel Codes: D64, D82, H41, Z13
Keywords: Intergenerational Transmission, Signaling, Values.
1 Introduction
Many parents see the family as the primary institution devoted to transmitting pro-social
values to children. For instance, the advice to avoid lying even when this may entail material
benefits, or not to let down those who rely on one’s actions are typical elements of parents’
teachings. More generally, a substantial amount of parents’ educational effort consists in
instilling values in their children that restrict behavior associated with imposing negative
externalities on others, and promote behavior associated with positive externalities. How-
ever, existing economic theory does not fully explain why parents are willing to spend time
∗We thank Ken Binmore, Luca Deidda, Steffen Huck, and seminar participants at SOAS and Bristol for
useful comments. Corresponding author: Silvia Sonderegger, Department of Economics, University of Bristol,
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and other resources to endow their children with values that, while benefiting other individ-
uals, appear to be in conflict with maximization of their children’s material welfare.1 In our
opinion, the recent interest of economists in the evolution of values within society2 has moved
this problem up in the agenda. A recent example is Tabellini (2008) who applies the “imper-
fect empathy” model of Bisin and Verdier (2001) (henceforth TBV) to the intergenerational
transmission of values.
In this paper, we borrow from the TBV framework the idea that parents are able to
manipulate the preferences of their children.3 However, the crucial assumption of our model
is that parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly
available to their children. If parents coordinate their educational efforts, a child would look
at her own set of values to predict the values that will prevail among her contemporaries.
Hence, children use introspection to assess whether it is optimal to trust other individuals in
society. A parent may thus choose to instil pro-social values into his child in order to signal
that others can generally be trusted.
While we see the model as an extreme simplification of reality, we find the analysis
useful in several respects. First, it builds on recent experimental evidence on the use of
introspection to predict the behavior of others.4 Glaeser et al. (2000) find that reported
trusting attitudes are a better predictor of an individual’s trustworthiness than of his/her
actual trusting behavior. Sapienza et al. (2007) rationalize this finding by arguing that
trust has a belief-based and a preference-based component. Subjects’ beliefs about their
opponent’s behavior are usually formed by extrapolating from their own behavior. In line
with these results, our model predicts that trustworthy children (i.e. children with pro-social
1Throughout the paper we abstract from issues of reputation. While these are clearly important, ex-
perimental evidence suggests that individuals do not act opportunistically even when interactions are one
shot and anonymous (see for instance Dawes and Thaler 1988 for an early survey). Moreover, as shown by
Andreoni (1995), this behavior is not simply the outcome of errors or confusion, but is rather connected with
some inbuilt trait (“kindness”). Of course, it is still possible that for some reason parents are unable to impart
contingent advice like “do not let down people with whom you may interact in the future” and therefore have
to stick to general principles/values. We find this possibility worth of further investigation.
2See Bisin and Verdier (2008) for a review of recent works.
3While parents’ educational effort in this direction is difficult to measure, the family environment seems
to be important in shaping preferences. Recent evidence suggests that parents’ generosity (Wilhem et al.
2008) and attitudes towards risk and trust (Dohmen et al. 2008) determine their children’s generosity and
attitudes, respectively.
4Psychologists have long recognized the importance of introspection for predicting the actions of others,
even to the point of generating a “false consensus effect” (see for instance the seminal paper by Ross et al.
1977). Mitchell at al. (2006) provide brainscan evidence that people use introspection to make inferences
about others who they perceive as “similar” to themselves.
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values) exhibit more trust than opportunistic children (in fact, as will become clear later,
this is an essential ingredient of our results).
A second implication of our analysis is that, since introspection is only valuable if par-
ents coordinate their educational efforts, an incentive to transmit pro-social values can only
arise when other parents are generally expected to do so. Hence, consistent with casual
observation, our model predicts that parental educational choices are characterized by com-
plementarities. A parent’s decision on how to educate his child is affected by the (expected)
educational choices of other parents, so that “good behavior breeds good behavior”. Impor-
tantly, however, these complementarities are not built in the parent’s utility function, but
emerge endogenously as a result of signaling from parents to children.5
Third, recent evidence (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000 and 2002, Uslaner and Brown 2005)
suggests that both trust and pro-social behavior are less likely to emerge in heterogeneous
societies. Our analysis provides a rationale for why this may be the case. In an extension to
the basic model, we show that, if heterogeneity is sufficiently large, the unique equilibrium is
one where parents avoid spending resources to endow their children with pro-social values.
Importantly, however, this result does not emerge from some exogenously-imposed dislike
of people who are “different” from oneself. Instead, it emerges from an information-based
argument, suggesting that what really matters here are informational differences rather than
differences along other dimensions.
Our analysis is a first step towards the development of a theory of why parents endow their
children with pro-social values that appear to be in conflict with the maximization of their
children’s material welfare. Such a theory should ideally complement the TBV approach.
The TBV framework is useful to analyze the evolution of values, but does not explain where
the fundamental economic benefit of having these values lies. The problem is in large part
bypassed through the assumption that parents have some measure of children’s utility –
rather than material welfare – in their objective function. The utility measure typically
reflects material welfare but also psychological costs or benefits not directly associated with
economic costs or benefits. These psychological benefits can be evaluated either with the
parent’s preferences (imperfect empathy) or with the child’s own preferences (full altruism).
5Complementarities also emerge in the model by Tabellini (2007), although in that paper they are imposed
exogenously.
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Under these assumptions, TBV show that parents may find it optimal to socialize their
children to a trait that does not maximize the children’s material welfare. While we do
not find these assumptions implausible, it is clear that, taken out of its specific context,
this approach risks becoming tautological. For instance, a parent may instil self-destructive
values into his child because they induce the self-destructive behavior that maximizes the
child’s utility as measured by a parent (or a child) with self-destructive values.6 By contrast,
we show that parents may want to endow their children with values that are apparently
in conflict with maximization of material welfare even when they are only interested in
their children’s material welfare.7 While these values reduce the benefit to the child of
behaving opportunistically, they may encourage the child to trust others. When others are
trustworthy, trusting yields economic benefits. This result is important, since it provides a
robust rationale for why pro-social behavior may persist even in the long-run.8
The paper contributes to the growing body of literature trying to model apparently
suboptimal behavior with information imperfections and belief manipulation (see for instance
Anderlini et al. 2007, Be´nabou, and Tirole, 2003 and 2007, Be´nabou, 2008, Guiso et al.
2008 for recent contributions to this literature, and Glaser and Konrad 1996 for an early
contribution). A strand of this literature focuses on the problem of self-signaling in games of
imperfect recall (Mullainathan 2002, Be´nabou and Tirole, 2004). Clearly enough, the case of
an altruistic parent whose actions convey information to an imperfectly informed child is not
very different from a problem of self-signaling. Among models of self-signaling, the intuition
for our result echoes the analysis of the prisoners’ dilemma in Bernheim and Thomadsen
(2005). Differently from most models of self-signaling, however, our results do not rely on
anticipatory feelings.
6Corneo and Jeanne (2006 and 2007) side-step this potential issue by assuming that parents transmit a
value system, rather than a preference trait to their children. This allows them to keep preferences fixed
throughout their analysis.
7Our approach thus shares similarities with Frank (1987), who shows that it may be in a person’s (material)
interest to have a utility function that predisposes him to behave in a trustworthy manner, even when he is
certain that, if he cheated, he would not be caught. In contrast with this work, however, here we explicitly
analyze optimal parental behavior. As will become clear below, the rationale for our result is therefore quite
different. In particular, it does not rely on the existence of an exogenous signal conveying information about
an agent’s type to potential trading partners.
8Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) show that, while cooperative agents tend to be wiped out by natural
selection, they generally survive under a cultural selection mechanism. However, “[this] selection criterion is
not based on objective (or purely material) payoffs but on payoffs as perceived by cultural parents according
to their own preferences and values” (p. 481). By contrast, our result implies that there exist equilibria in
which socializing children to pro-social values is actually optimal from a material viewpoint.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the model. Section three presents
the main result. Section four discusses the case of an heterogenous society. Section five
concludes.
2 The Basic Model
There is a continuum of Parent (P ) - Child (C) pairs and two periods. In the first period,
parents simultaneously choose how to educate their children. We model the outcome of
the parent’s educational choices as a type τ for the child. There are two possible types of
children, trustworthy τ = T and opportunistic τ = O.9 In the second period, children (now
grown-up) observe their type and engage in economic activity.
The Child’s Problem
For simplicity, we model economic activity as a “trust game” in which an agent (trustor)
chooses whether to trust or not another agent (trustee) who, if trusted, can choose whether
to honor or betray the trust given. We assume that each child is randomly and anonymously
matched with two contemporaries, and performs the role of trustee in one match and the
role of trustor in the other. All children are simultaneously matched. In the first stage of
the game, each child chooses whether to trust or not to trust the stranger with whom she
has been matched. This can be seen as the child’s decision to enter a partnership, to entrust
a financial intermediary with her saving, to hire an employee, etc. In the second stage, each
individual who has been trusted chooses whether to honor or to betray the trust received.
Notice that the timing of the game is designed to assume away all issues of reputation.
Material payoffs are as follows. If the trustor chooses to trust and the trustee chooses to
honor, both obtain a payoff of θ > 0. If the trustor trusts and the trustee betrays, the
trustor obtains −δ, δ > 0, and the trustee obtains β > θ. If the trustor chooses not to trust,
then both obtain 0. Notice that, from a material viewpoint, it is always optimal to betray
when trusted. As a result, if only material payoffs matter, it is always optimal not to trust.
However, we assume that trustworthy individuals also have a psychological cost of betraying.
9In principle, parents may also be of type T or O. However, we assume that parents only wish to
maximize their children’s material welfare, and have no direct preferences over their children’s type. As a
result, a parent’s own type has no influence on his educational choice. This allows us to focus on our main
point, namely that parents may optimally decide to instill pro-social values in their children, even if all they
care about is maximize their children’s material welfare.
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The psychological cost is always greater than β − θ so that trustworthy individuals always
choose to honor when trusted.10 On the other hand, the type τ of the counterparty is private
information so that an individual cannot observe whether her counterparty is trustworthy
or opportunistic.
The Parent’s Problem
We assume that educating children as trustworthy individuals is relatively more costly than
educating them as opportunistic. This assumption works against the result we are set to
prove, and therefore makes our results more compelling. Moreover, it appears to be realistic.
For simplicity, we standardize the cost of educating the child as opportunistic to zero and
assume that educating the child as trustworthy costs k > 0. The cost k is assumed to be
identical to all parents (this is relaxed in the next section).11
Parents choose the type τ of their child as to maximize
UP (τ) = λUC(τ)− c(τ) (1)
where UC(τ) is the lifetime material payoff of a type τ child and c(τ) is the cost of socializing
the child to type τ , so that c(O) = 0 and c(T ) = k. The parameter λ > 0 is a measure
of intergenerational altruism. The environment described is consistent with the idea that
trustworthy children are a public good. The parents’ problem thus resembles the problem of
private provision of public goods.
Information
A child does not observe the actions of parents different from her own. Children observe
their own type (but not the type of other children) and can use this information to form
expectations on the fraction of their contemporaries who share their same type. The crucial
assumption of the model is that parents have more information than their children about
some characteristic of society. To model this, we consider the case in which the cost k of
socializing a child to behave pro-socially is observed by all parents but is unobservable by the
10Alternatively, one could assume that type T individuals experience a “warm glow” when honoring trust
(see Andreoni, 1990).
11As already mentioned, parents may themselves be trustworthy or opportunistic. In that case, it is
possible that the cost k of educating children pro-socially may change, according to the parent’s type (and
may presumably be lower for a trustworthy). Allowing for this would make the model more involved without
changing the main results.
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children. The prior distribution for k is denoted with f(k), f(.) is assumed to be continuous
and has full support (0,∞).
Our setup thus focuses on the case of asymmetric information about some “economic”
characteristic of society, like the cost k. However, as discussed in the next section, our results
straightforwardly extend to the case of asymmetric information over variables that are not
immediately payoff-relevant.
If a parent’s educational choices are contingent on the realization of k, the parent’s action
conveys information about k to the child. If all parents follow strategies contingent of k,
then the child would use the information about k inferred from her parent’s action to form
expectations on the fraction of her contemporaries who are trustworthy. The natural solution
concept for this problem is thus Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE requires that, 1)
all players play best replies given their beliefs, 2) children’s beliefs are derived from parents’
equilibrium strategies by using Bayes rule where possible.
Before presenting the main result, it is worth to discuss what happens in the benchmark
case when the share of different types (trustworthy/opportunistic) among their contempo-
raries is observable by children. Denote this fraction with pi ∈ [0, 1]. A child would trust
(independently of her type) only if piθ − (1 − pi)δ ≥ 0. Let pi∗ ≡ δθ+δ . Then, if pi ≥ pi∗,
both types obtain piθ − (1 − pi)δ as trustor. However, in their role of trustee, type O ob-
tain β whereas type T obtain only θ. By contrast, if pi < pi∗ no one trusts and, therefore,
both types obtain zero both as trustor and as trustee. As a result, UC(O) ≥ UC(T ) for all
pi, so that all parents choose to educate their child as type O. This implies pi = 0 < pi∗.
Thus, when pi is observable by all, the free rider problem induces parents not to transmit
pro-social values to their children. Incidentally, notice that with only two parent-child pairs,
the game between the two parents would essentially be a prisoners’ dilemma for all k such
that λ(θ − δ) < k < 2λθ.
3 Introspection and parents’ free riding
The setup in which the children observe k is characterized by two particular features. First,
the child’s choice of whether to trust or not is independent of the education received. Second,
independently of other parents’ choices, it is dominant for the parent to raise his child as
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opportunistic.
As already argued, these features contrast with empirical evidence and casual observation.
The case in which k is unobservable can address both of them. If parents coordinate their
educational choices, then children can infer the type of their counterparty from their own
type (introspection). This generates complementarities between the parents’ decisions: when
other parents raise their children as trustworthy, a parent may have incentive to do the same,
in order to signal to his child that it is optimal to trust others. The game between parents
thus resembles a stag-hunt, rather than a prisoners’ dilemma. As a result of complementarity,
the parents’ behavior is coordinated, as if they were all obeying the same norm. Importantly,
however, this arises endogenously, as a result of signaling from parents to children, rather
than as a result of in-built complementarities – as would for instance be the case if parents
explicitly cared about “following the norm”.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to equilibria where all parents follow the same cutoff
strategy k∗. This involves educating the child as trustworthy when k is below a cutoff k∗
and educating the child as opportunistic otherwise.
Proposition 1. If β < 2θ, then there exists a continuum of PBE such that: 1) Children
choose to trust when their parents socialize them to the trustworthy type and choose not to
trust otherwise; 2) All parents follow the same cutoff strategy k∗ ∈ [0, λ(2θ − β)] which pre-
scribes socializing their children to the trustworthy type when k ≤ k∗ and to the opportunistic
type when k > k∗.
Proof. Given the parents’ strategy, a type T child believes k ≤ k∗ which involves pi = 1.
Therefore, she always trusts. A type O child believes that k > k∗ which involves pi = 0.
As a result, a type O child would not trust. Consider parent i now and suppose that all
other parents j 6= i play a cutoff strategy k∗. We want to show that playing k∗ is a best
reply for parent i. Notice that, since parent i’s payoff is monotone in k, any non-degenerate
best reply takes the form of a cutoff strategy. If i plays k∗ he obtains 2λθ − k when k ≤ k∗
and 0 when k > k∗. Suppose first that i chooses a cutoff ki > k∗. Then, for k ≥ ki and
k ≤ k∗ he would obtain a payoff identical to the payoff that is obtainable by playing k∗. For
k ∈ (k∗, ki), parent i would obtain −λδ − k < 0. Since he would obtain 0 by playing k∗,
any ki > k∗ is dominated. Consider now ki < k∗. Again, this cutoff yields the same payoff
as k∗ for k ≤ ki and k ≥ k∗. For k ∈ (ki, k∗) it yields λβ. Hence, playing ki is dominated
whenever k∗ < λ(2θ − β).
Proposition 1 thus implies that, when k < k∗, economic interactions in period two are
characterized by cooperation.
It is crucial to realize that this is an atypical signaling game. If parents coordinate their
educational choices, a parent may find it optimal to raise his child as trustworthy in order
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to signal to her that the value of k is low. However, the value of k does not directly enter
the child’s payoff. Information about k is only valuable to the child to the extent that it
conveys information about the actions of other parents – since this information enables the
child to make an informed choice about whether or not to trust her contemporaries. In our
model, therefore, parents are motivated by the desire to inform their child about the actions
that other parents are likely to take. This stands in contrast with most signaling models,
where agents are motivated by the desire to provide information about themselves.12 Note
also that, when educating his child as trustworthy, the parent bears the direct cost, k, and
also an indirect cost, λ(β − θ), due to the fact that a trustworthy child will forgo profitable
opportunities to betray when trusted.
Another point worth stressing is that, as already mentioned, the result does not require
that parents have private information on variables (such as k) that are immediately rele-
vant for their payoffs. Cooperation could be sustained even in the presence of asymmetric
information over a “sunspot”, on whose realization parents may condition their educational
choices. The sunspot variable would act as an equilibrium-selection device, and could be in-
terpreted as indicating the prevailing “culture” or social norm within a particular society.13
What is really crucial for the result is that parents observe the sunspot, while their children
do not. Hence, in contrast with existing models of social norms (such as Kandel and Lazear
1994) here the parents’ incentive for following the norm is not exogenously built in their
utility function. Rather, it emerges endogenously from their desire to convey information to
their children about the type of society in which their children will live.14
A possible objection to the set of equilibria we consider is that they may appear to
depend on arbitrary restrictions on the parent’s message space. To fix ideas, suppose that
the parent could choose to raise the child as opportunistic for all values of k and just “tell”
the child to trust others when he observes k ≤ k∗. If the message were credible, then the
parent would find it optimal to follow this strategy. Moreover, since all parents would prefer
12This feature shares similarities with Sliwka (2007), who shows that an employer may optimally decide to
trust his (conformist) employee in order to signal to him that trustworthiness is the prevailing norm among
other employees.
13See for instance Kreps (1996) for a model of culture as an equilibrium-selection device.
14This shares similarities with Bernheim (1994), who also shows that norm-following may endogenously
emerge from signaling concerns. In Bernheim’s case, individuals (who care directly about status and social
esteem) follow the norm in order to send a signal about their type. Here, the signaling game is more subtle.
Parents follow the norm in order to signal to their children that this is indeed the dominant norm.
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this strategy to their equilibrium strategy, all equilibria in which parents cooperate (i.e. with
k∗ > 0) would unravel. There are two reasons why such a contradictory message would not
be necessarily believed by the child. First, given an equilibrium of Proposition 1, the child
may hold any belief about k when receiving an out of equilibrium message. For instance, if
out of equilibrium beliefs assign a high probability to k > k∗, the child would choose not to
trust. As a result, the parent would then be better off by following his equilibrium strategy.
However, it is unclear whether these out of equilibrium beliefs are particularly sensible, since
the parent can only benefit from sending this message when k ≤ k∗. We find the second
reason more compelling. In principle, upon observing her parent sending such a message,
the child could doubt the fact that other parents are educating their children pro-socially. In
the spirit of the model, it seems natural to assume that, when facing an out of equilibrium
message, the child would use again introspection to update her beliefs about her peers. She
would therefore suspect that the parents of other children might behave as her parent and
would accordingly decide not to trust.
4 Heterogeneity
Common sense suggests that subjects rely less on introspection in environments characterized
by individuals with heterogenous backgrounds.15 A direct implication of our model is that,
since introspection is less important when heterogeneity is high, the parents’ incentive to raise
their children as trustworthy is weakened. Suppose that there are N ≥ 1 groups of identical
size 1/N in the population. We will use N as a measure of the degree of heterogeneity
within the population. Each group n = 1, ..., N experiences an independent drawn kn from
the same distribution f(k). Group-n parents observe their group-specific realization kn but
not the realization for other groups.
Consider any equilibrium in which all group-n parents socialize their children to the
trustworthy type if kn belongs to a set K, where K is a subset of the support of f(kn), i.e.
K ⊆ (0,∞). For simplicity, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which K is the
same to all groups. Let P (K) denote the probability that kn ∈ K. In equilibrium, the child
chooses to trust when observing T and chooses not to trust when observing O. This is a
15Sapienza et al. (2007) use this argument to explain different correlations between trustworthiness and
reported trust attitudes in homogenous groups (undergraduate students of the same institution) vis-a´-vis
heterogenous groups (households).
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best reply if (θ + δ)E(pi|T ) − δ ≥ 0 and (θ + δ)E(pi|O) − δ ≤ 0. These conditions can be
rewritten as16
(θ + δ)
N − 1
N
P (K)− δ ≤ 0 ≤ (θ + δ)
[
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P (K)
]
− δ (3)
We must determine conditions under which a parent finds it optimal to socialize his child to
type T if and only if kn ∈ K, given other parents’ strategies. Given a realization kn ∈ K,
a group-n parent would find it optimal to raise his child as trustworthy if λ[E(UC(T )|kn ∈
K)− E(UC(O)|kn ∈ K)] ≤ kn, or
λ
[
(θ + δ)
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P (K)
)
− δ + (θ − β)
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P (K)
)]
≥ kn (4)
where the first two terms in brackets represent the benefit that the child derives from trusting
her counterparty. The last term in brackets is the cost of forgoing the opportunity to betray
– and to obtain β > θ as a trustee. Similarly, given kn /∈ K, a group-n parent would raise
his child as opportunistic if,
λ
[
(θ + δ)
(
N − 1
N
P (K)
)
− δ + (θ − β)
(
N − 1
N
P (K)
)]
≤ kn (5)
Condition (4) and (5) are the parent’s incentive compatibility constraints for kn ∈ K and
kn /∈ K respectively. Notice also that, given kn > 0, and β > θ, condition (4) always implies
that the second inequality in (3) holds. Symmetrically, the first inequality in (3) always
implies condition (5). In summary, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium
with cooperation are condition (4) for kn ∈ K and the first inequality in (3). We are now
ready to state the main result.
Proposition 2. For any K 6= ∅, there exists N such that, for all N > N , K is not compatible
with equilibrium.
Proof. Given the first inequality in (3), for any kn ∈ K, condition (4) necessarily implies
λ
[
(θ + δ)
(
1
N
)
+ (θ − β)
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P (K)
)]
≥ kn (6)
given β > θ, this requires that λ(θ + δ) ≥ Nkn. Clearly enough, for any kn > 0 there exists
N such that the above is violated for all N > N .
16A child of type T of group n expects the fraction of trustworthy individuals to be,
E(pi|T ) = E(pi|kn ∈ K) = 1
N
+
1
N
N−1∑
j=1
j
(
N − 1
j
)
P (K)j(1− P (K))N−1−j
=
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P (K) (2)
By the same token, E(pi|O) = E(pi|kn /∈ K) = N−1N P (K).
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Hence, all equilibria in which parents cooperate with positive probability (i.e. equilibria
with K 6= ∅) disappear if the degree of heterogeneity N is sufficiently high. The rationale
for the result is that, as heterogeneity increases, parents’ actions (and thus children’s types)
tend to be less correlated. Hence, parents’ educational choices are less informative for the
children’s decision to trust. As a result, the signaling benefit of raising a child as trustworthy
is outweighed by the cost. Note that, as in the previous section, the result straightforwardly
extends to environments where parents condition their educational choice on the realization
of (group-specific) “sunspots”, representing culture or social norms.
Proposition 2 suggests that the reason why heterogeneity may make the transmission of
pro-social values less likely is essentially an information-based one. What really matters here
are informational differences, rather than differences along other dimensions.
Although the result is broadly consistent with empirical evidence17, we do not want to
claim that diversity is necessarily detrimental on the basis of an oversimplified view of the
world. Several arguments warn for caution in interpreting the result. First, we considered
heterogeneity in the cost of socializing children to pro-social behavior. However, there may
be heterogeneity in the quality and degree of conformity to social norms. For instance, the
arrival of a group of immigrants who socialize their children to pro-social values in a society
trapped in a bad equilibrium exerts a positive externality on the society. If the group’s
attitudes towards children education are observable to all parents, natives may find it optimal
to instil pro-social values in their children as well. Similarly, in our model, heterogeneity
always reduces coordination. As shown by Grout et al. (2008), this is not necessarily the
case. Finally, homogeneity makes it easier to transmit values that appear pro-social in the
eyes of a particular community, but could be harmful for the wider society. The other
side of the coin may thus be that homogenous communities are more prone to fanaticism,
intolerance, and ideological bias.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that parents may want to bear the cost of instilling pro-social values into
their children even when lacking any direct preference over their children’s values. If other
parents coordinate their educational choices, a parent may want to conform and endow his
17For instance, participation in associational activities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) and level of trust
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) tend to be lower in more heterogenous communities.
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child with pro-social values to signal to the child that others can be trusted. Future research
should address possible conflicts of interests between parents and children and the role of
other educational devices such as schools, role models, social networks.
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